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Abstract: 
 
Ambitious scenarios of carbon emission redistribution for mitigating climate change in line with 
the Paris Agreement and reaching the sustainable development goal of eradicating poverty 
have been proposed recently.  They imply a strong reduction in carbon footprint inequality by 
2030 that effectively halves the Gini coefficient to about 0.25.  This paper examines feasibility of 
these scenarios by analyzing the historical evolution of both weighted international inequality in 
CO2 emissions attributed territorially and global inequality in carbon footprints attributed to end 
consumers.  For the latter, a new dataset is constructed that is more comprehensive than 
existing ones.  In both cases, we find a decreasing trend in global inequality, partially attributed 
to the move of China from the lower to the middle part of the distribution, with footprints more 
unequal than territorial emissions.  These results show that realization of the redistributive 
scenarios would require an unprecedented reduction in global inequality far below historical 
levels.  Moreover, the territorial emissions data, available for more recent years up to 2017, 
show a saturation of the decreasing Gini coefficient at a level of 0.5.  This observation confirms 
an earlier prediction based on maximal entropy reasoning that the Lorenz curve converges to 
the exponential distribution.  This saturation further undermines feasibility of the redistributive 
scenarios, which are also hindered by structural tendencies that reinforce carbon footprint 
inequality under global capitalism.   One way out of this conundrum is a fast decarbonization of 
the global energy supply in order to decrease global carbon emissions without relying crucially 
on carbon inequality reduction. 
 
Keywords: carbon footprint; Lorenz curve; Gini coefficient; global capitalism; maximum entropy; 
sustainable development
 
1. Introduction 
The problem of mitigating climate change is increasingly linked with issues of inequality 
(Cantore and Padilla, 2010; Rao and Min, 2018; Zimm and Nakicenovic, 2019). At the 
international level, the Kyoto Protocol distributed responsibilities of climate change mitigation 
unequally across countries that also had unequal emissions and capacities to mitigate. But the 
United States did not ratify the treaty, because developing countries were not required to cut 
emissions (Schiermeier, 2012). More recently, this debate was revisited in unsuccessful 
negotiations in Copenhagen in 2009 about a follow-up treaty to Kyoto (Bailey, 2010). It 
ultimately led to countries pledging to do what their own governments thought was achievable, 
 
* Political Economy Research Institute & Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts Amherst; 
& Department of Economics, SOAS University of London. 
† Corresponding Author: gsemieniuk@econs.umass.edu  
‡ CMTC and JQI, Department of Physics, University of Maryland, College Park, MD. 
 2/26 
but not necessarily consistent with the global mitigation goal, the so-called Intended Nationally 
Determined Contributions under the 2015 Paris Agreement (Rogelj et al., 2016). At the national 
level, Jenkins (2014) warns that political economy constraints, in particular different abilities to 
pay and political resistance to regressive policies, may hinder policy implementation. Schor 
(2015) suggests that income redistribution could raise the chances for successful climate 
mitigation, and Boyce (2019) proposes a carbon dividend that redistributes the proceeds of a 
regressive carbon tax equitably among the population. In a more or less direct fashion, all of 
these socio-economic conflicts follow from the underlying problem that greenhouse emissions 
themselves are unequally distributed across countries and people. 
 
It is now well known that, not only current per capita greenhouse gas emissions are vastly 
unequal across countries, but that cumulative emissions – which matter for greenhouse gas 
concentrations – are even more unequal. This leads directly to the argument that countries with 
higher per capita emissions should also be responsible for more per capita mitigation than poor 
ones (Pan et al., 2015). Increasingly, emissions inequality is also analyzed at the interpersonal 
level. According to one estimate, the highest 10% income earners are responsible for 
approximately 45% of global greenhouse emissions (Chancel and Piketty, 2015). Therefore, it is 
natural to ask how to take the inequality in carbon emissions into account when crafting 
mitigation strategies. 
 
A prominent proposal for how to do this was advanced by Chakravarty et al. (2009) who 
suggested capping the level of per capita carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions above a certain 
threshold. This cap would leave low emitters unaffected and shift the burden of mitigation to 
those with large emissions. Since emissions are highly positively correlated with income, this 
would also be equitable in the sense that the richest persons would have to deal with this 
problem. They showed that global CO2 emissions could be reduced by 30% in 2030 if the billion 
highest emitters would cap their emissions at the level of their least polluting member. At the 
time of their writing, this reduction satisfied then prevailing climate change mitigation goals. We 
call it the “cap scenario” in the rest of the paper. 
 
A related study by Hubacek et al. (2017) found that fulfilling the first of the United Nations’ 
Sustainable Development Goals (UN SDGs), the eradication of poverty, would not only “lift” 
billions out of material poverty, but also raise their carbon footprint to the level of the non-poor 
due to the effect of higher purchasing power on emissions. Effectively, this would level 
emissions at the bottom of the distribution and put a floor under how little a person emits. Thus, 
we call it the “floor scenario” in the rest of the paper. While this paper was primarily concerned 
with the side effect on greenhouse gas emissions due to poverty reduction, it pointed out an 
important issue: that poverty reduction is intimately tied up with the distribution of emissions. 
 
Surprisingly, while both of these proposals imply large reductions in emissions inequality, they 
did not attempt to quantify the change in carbon emissions or footprint inequality. Indeed, to the 
best of our knowledge, there is little research on the level and evolution of historical global 
carbon footprint inequality. Before reviewing the literature, it is useful to distinguish between 
different categories both of inequality and emissions. When analyzing inequality across 
countries, researchers usually refer to three different concepts of inequality (Milanovic, 2005). 
The first is international inequality, which takes one data point for each country, e.g. the average 
per capita carbon emissions. International inequality is typically considered in studies of 
convergence. The second type is weighted international inequality, where each observation is 
weighted proportionally to the country’s population. Weighting serves to convey an impression 
of the global distribution and sometimes proxies for the third type, discussed next. The third type 
is global inequality, which does not look at countries as organizing units but instead at persons, 
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or groups of persons, and their emissions distribution across the entire world. Here, belonging to 
a country’s population is unimportant, although in practice estimates tend to use quantiles of 
country’s populations and weigh them according to the country’s size (Chancel & Piketty 2015). 
The cap and floor scenarios we just reviewed are falling into the global inequality category. 
 
When talking about emissions, the most common measure is territorial emissions, that is the 
emissions produced in a country when burning fossil fuels. These are straightforward to 
calculate: Since there are good statistics about fossil fuel consumption, and the carbon content 
of these fuels is accurately known, it is a simple calculation to obtain territorial emissions. Then 
per capita emissions are just these total territorial emissions divided by the domestic population. 
We will refer to this measure as territorial emissions or simply CO2 emissions. Carbon footprints, 
on the other hand, are calculated from “consumption-based” carbon accounting whereby all 
those emissions created in the production of all the final goods that are consumed in the 
territory are attributed to the country. The carbon footprint attributes the emissions from 
production to the final consumer, regardless of where they are emitted. National consumption-
based and territorial emissions can vary considerably (Kander et al., 2015; Peters et al., 2011), 
and it is hotly debated which measure or a combination should be used to attribute responsibility 
(Tukker et al., 2020). For the purpose of interpersonal global inequality, it makes most sense, 
however, to consider the carbon footprint. Consumption expenditures of households are only 
indirectly related to territorial emissions (many of which are generated by the production of 
goods that are exported) but are directly linked to the carbon embodied in the goods purchased. 
 
The literature can be classified according to these concepts. Most research has considered 
territorial emissions inequality, and here inequality between people within countries has been 
neglected relative to the attention given to international inequality (Islam and Winkel, 2017). 
Between countries, one focus is on convergence of country mean emissions, which finds 
convergence between groups of clubs, but no overall convergence (Aldy, 2006; Pettersson et 
al., 2014). These convergence studies do not typically quantify their results in terms of inequality 
indices. Another set of studies decomposes changes in (unweighted) international CO2 
emissions inequality (Grunewald et al., 2014; Heil and Wodon, 1997). Duro (2013) weighted and 
provided changes in the Gini coefficient, but did not report the actual inequality levels. Apart 
from these sets of studies, only Lawrence et al. (2013) and Zimm and Nakicenovic (2019) 
showed the evolution of weighted international inequality in territorial emissions since 1980 and 
1990 respectively, which has been decreasing. Rao and Min (2018) used an estimated increase 
by 7 Gini points per decade in China’s income in the past to argue this is a plausible upper limit 
for the rate of decrease in emissions inequality in general. Research on carbon footprints is 
scarcer. Wang and Zhou (2018) computed weighted international carbon footprint inequality but 
included only 40 regions. Closest to an evaluation of global carbon inequality may be Chancel 
and Piketty (2015), who compared how total footprint shares of various quantiles had changed 
and noted that between-country inequality had fallen, while within-country inequality had risen 
according to the Theil index. However, most of their evidence refers only to two years: 1998 and 
2013 (the latter being extrapolated from 2008 income distribution and carbon footprint data), 
and the brunt of their analysis considers the 2013 snapshot. Overall, the literature on the level 
and evolution of global carbon footprint inequality is, at best, incomplete. 
 
To improve our understanding of the ambitious scenarios for carbon emissions reduction, we 
analyze the historical evolution of inequality, both weighted international for territorial emissions 
and global for footprints. Section 2 quantifies the levels of carbon footprint inequality implicit in 
the “cap” and “floor” scenarios. In Section 3, we examine historical evolution of weighted 
international inequality in territorial emissions based on Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
data for 1980-2017 by extending previous estimates in Lawrence et al. (2013) and re-evaluating 
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their prediction of an exponential distribution based on maximal entropy reasoning. In Section 4, 
we present the methodology for estimating global carbon footprints. We construct a new 
estimate based on a balanced panel of consumption expenditure data for twelve population 
quantiles from the Global Consumption and Income Project, GCIP (Lahoti et al., 2016) for most 
countries from 1995 to 2013, and a slightly smaller panel from 1970 to 1990, which excludes the 
former Soviet Union. Using a constant expenditure elasticity of footprints, we link consumption 
expenditure to the carbon footprint data from the multi-regional input-output database Eora for 
all years (Kanemoto et al., 2016; Lenzen et al., 2013). In Section 5, we compare our results with 
those by Chancel and Piketty (2015), as well as the estimates for the cap and floor scenarios. 
Based on the analysis of our results, in Section 6 we discuss challenges for the achievement of 
the scenarios drawing on the literature about global capitalism and the maximal entropy 
perspective. 
 
We contribute to the research on carbon inequality by providing new evidence about the 
historical convergence of both weighted international carbon emissions inequality and carbon 
footprints toward an exponential distribution with a Gini of 0.5, as predicted by Lawrence et al. 
(2013). We also provide the first estimate of longer-term carbon footprint inequality evolution in 
the global economy and contrast it with climate change mitigation scenarios that often imply a 
quantifiable reduction in carbon inequality. While a more precise measure would require 
elasticities that vary by country, quantile, and over time (Grubler and Pachauri, 2009), we 
believe that using a constant elasticity gives us a good first approximation of the evolution of 
carbon inequality and countries’ position within it over recent decades. An important take-away 
from our discussion is that policies seeking to harness reductions in inequality – whether at the 
top or bottom of the distribution – have to lean very heavily against persistent structural forces 
tending to high levels of inequality. Decarbonizing the energy supply can alleviate some of the 
need to grapple with carbon inequality for climate change mitigation, as it reduces emissions 
across the board. 
 
2. Inequality in the cap and floor scenarios of carbon footprints 
To start out, we illustrate the ability to quantify the extent of inequality in the cap and floor 
scenarios of future carbon footprints. In the cap scenario by Chakravarty et al. (2009), if the top 
billion emitters were to reduce their carbon footprint to those of the next billion by 2030, CO2 
emissions would be lowered in 2030 by 1/3 from 43 Gigatonnes in a business-as-usual scenario 
to 30 Gt, thereby reaching the climate change mitigation targets for the whole world estimated at 
the time of their writing.1 This cap on top emitters’ footprints implies eradicating inequality at the 
top of the emissions distribution, while leaving poorer emitters unaffected. More recently, 
Hubacek et al. (2017) instead calculated the impact on CO2 emissions from putting a moderate 
floor under the income of everyone in the world (USD 2.97 per day or USD 1,084 per year) in 
the spirit of the first UN SDG. Abstracting from geographical and structural factors affecting 
carbon emissions, this puts a floor under carbon footprints and implies perfect equality at the 
bottom of the footprint distribution while leaving the top unaffected. 
 
Although the inequality implications are obvious, neither proposal has attempted to quantify 
what impact on relative carbon footprint inequality their scenarios would have. In this paper we 
choose to quantify inequality via Lorenz curves. The Lorenz curve has considerable intuitive 
appeal and is widely used to analyze the evolution of inequality in energy consumption 
 
1 Chakravarty et al. actually considered territorial emissions, while the footprint datasets were still under 
construction at the time of their writing. Had footprint datasets been available, they could have been used 
instead of territorial emissions. 
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(Jacobson et al., 2005; Lawrence et al., 2013) and CO2 emissions (Groot, 2010; Sager, 2019; 
Zimm and Nakicenovic, 2019). This is due to its graphical depiction of inequality as the 
divergence of the Lorenz curve from the perfect equality diagonal. Since the Gini coefficient is 
defined as twice the area between the perfect equality diagonal and the Lorenz curve, we use it 
as a numerical quantifier of choice alongside the Lorenz curve. For an introduction and formal 
definition of these measures see e.g. Cowell (2011) or Sen and Foster (1997). 
 
To apply these measures, we implement the two scenarios on a 2010 empirical estimate of the 
global distribution of carbon footprints that Hubacek et al. (2017) also provide. This distribution 
modifies the World Bank’s Consumption Database to partition the world’s population into 5 
income brackets, the lowest comprising 15.5% of the population who earn less than USD 1.90 
per day, then the 34.5% of global population earning between USD 1.9 and USD 2.97 a day and 
three more such quantiles representing the remaining 25%, 15% and 10% of the global 
population. Since these data also provide information on the basket of goods consumed, 
Hubacek et al. (2017) can link this to the demanded goods’ carbon footprints supplied sector by 
sector from the Eora multi-regional input-output database, and so calculate the per capita 
carbon footprint for each quantile. With this global distribution at hand, the cap scenario simply 
scales down the top quantile’s footprint to the level of the second one, and then both further until 
total emissions become two thirds of the initial estimate. The floor scenario scales up the bottom 
two quantiles’ per capita footprints to the level of the third one, as a result of raising incomes 
assumed by Hubacek et al. It is also possible to combine the two scenarios. Then the bottom 
two quantiles are scaled up to that of the third, while the top two quantiles must scale down their 
carbon footprint even more in order to reduce total emissions back to those of the cap scenario. 
The cap+floor scenario can be thought of as simultaneously eradicating poverty and neutralizing 
the additional emissions. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates these quantifications using Lorenz curves. The cap scenario (blue triangles) 
shows a straight line for the top two quantiles that include the highest 25% of emitters, i.e. 
equality at the top of the distribution. The floor scenario (red squares) instead shows 
proportional increases in population and share of carbon footprints, i.e. equality, for about the 
75% lowest emitters. The combined scenario (green disks) is close to global equality (the 
straight diagonal line). These curves translate into Gini coefficients of 0.32 (cap), 0.27 (floor), 
and 0.07 (both). For a reference, we also plot the Lorenz curve of an exponential distribution 
discussed in Sec. 3, which corresponds to a Gini of 0.5.  Historical evolution of the Lorenz 
curves for carbon emissions and footprints will be shown in Figures 2 and 4 discussed in the 
corresponding sections of the paper. It is clear that, under any proposed scenarios, carbon 
footprint inequality would be very low compared to the actual estimates of global carbon 
inequality, which is more unequal than an exponential distribution and has Gini coefficient above 
0.5. A realization that these inequality reduction targets are implicitly present in the current goals 
by the governments of the world (UN SDGs and Paris Agreement) raises the question whether 
such proposals are realistic, given how distant they are from the empirical carbon Lorenz curves 
and Gini coefficients, discussed in more detail in the rest of the paper. 
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Figure 1: Lorenz plots for the global carbon footprint per capita estimated for five income groups for three scenarios 
that variously eradicate inequality among the bottom half (red squares), the top billion of the population (blue 
triangles), and both scenarios combined (green disks) relative to 2010 data. Perfect equality (dashed black line) and 
an exponential distribution (solid black line) are plotted for comparison. Data construction is discussed in Section 2. 
 
3. Territorial inequality in CO2 emissions and the maximal entropy 
interpretation 
To assess the historical evolution of inequality, we first investigate the distribution of territorial 
carbon emissions, which is straightforwardly available. Lawrence et al. (2013) computed 
weighted international inequality, i.e. one observation per country, using the U.S. Energy 
Information Agency (EIA) data on population and territorial CO2 emissions for 1980-2010. Since 
then, new data became available for subsequent years, so we show the updated Lorenz curves 
through 2017 in Figure 2. One can see a significant decrease of carbon emissions inequality 
from 1980 to 2010, the period studied by Lawrence et al. (2013), which they interpreted as 
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evolution toward the exponential distribution corresponding to maximal entropy. The paper 
predicted that further evolution of the Lorenz curve and the decrease of inequality would stop 
once the exponential distribution is reached.  Indeed, Figure 2 shows no significant change from 
2010 to 2017, and both curves are close to the exponential distribution.  Thus, the new IEA data 
for 2011-2017, which became available after publication of their paper, confirm the prediction by 
Lawrence et al. (2013) that the Lorenz curve evolution saturates at the exponential distribution. 
 
Interestingly, the empirical data points for 2010 (not to be confused with the hypothetical “floor 
scenario” for 2030 discussed in Sec. 2) from Hubacek et al. (2017), obtained by a very different 
method, also approximately fall on the Lorenz curve corresponding to the exponential 
distribution, as shown by red stars in Figure 2.  It is encouraging that the independent and 
methodologically different studies by Hubacek et al. (2017) and by Lawrence et al. (2013) 
produce qualitatively consistent Lorenz curves for 2010. While territorial emissions are not the 
best for examining global inequality, the EIA data analysis shown in Figure 2 serves as a useful 
benchmark for comparison with other measures, because of the wide coverage (available since 
1980 and for the largest part of the world, especially after 1990) and the least amount of 
imputation (in contrast to Sec. 4). 
 
Furthermore, Lawrence et al. (2013) also observed a decline of the global Gini coefficient for 
CO2 emissions from 0.67 to 0.52 and predicted an S-shaped time evolution of the Gini 
coefficient, saturating at 0.5 when the exponential distribution is achieved.  The new data points 
that became available from EIA for the years 2011-2017 after publication of their paper confirm 
this prediction.  These new data points indicated by red squares in Figure 3 clearly show 
saturation at the 0.5 level.  The theoretical prediction of this saturation is particularly striking, 
because the black circles in Figure 3, as published in Lawrence et al. (2013), do not give any 
indication of saturation yet and could be naively (but incorrectly) extrapolated along the straight 
dashed line indicating a linear decrease of inequality. 
 
The remarkable alignment with, and convergence to, an exponential distribution suggests a 
general mechanism at work in keeping inequality above the 0.5 Gini level.  Banerjee and 
Yakovenko (2010) and Lawrence et al. (2013) developed a novel approach to predicting global 
inequality in energy consumption and carbon emissions based on the maximal entropy principle.  
In this framework, a global pool of extracted fossil fuels is distributed by transnational 
corporations for consumption by human population.  Although, hypothetically, fossil fuels can be 
partitioned equally among the human population (corresponding to a zero Gini, somewhat like in 
the cap+floor scenario discussed in Sec. 2), such a distribution is extremely improbable.  In 
contrast, based on combinatorial arguments, the most probable distribution is the one that 
maximizes entropy of the partition, subject to the constraint on the total fossil fuel pool.  
Mathematically, this distribution is described by the exponential function, which was earlier 
discussed in the context of monetary and income inequality (Dragulescu and Yakovenko, 2001, 
2000; Tao et al., 2019; Yakovenko, 2013; Yakovenko and Rosser, 2009). Conceptual aspects of 
entropy applications to economic and social problems are reviewed by Rosser (2016), and 
antagonism between entropic and anti-entropic social forces is discussed by Rosser (2020). 
 
The partitioning model is particularly suitable for the study of territorial inequality in CO2 
emissions, because fossil fuels are readily transportable on global scale (especially coal and oil, 
but less so natural gas) and then are burned to produce CO2.  Lawrence et al. (2013) also 
applied a similar argument to global inequality in energy consumption, under assumption that 
most energy comes from fossil fuels.  This assumption is applicable only approximately.  A more 
recent study by Semieniuk and Weber (2019) found a significant difference between the 
analyses based on the EIA data in Lawrence et al. (2013) and other data sources using different 
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methodologies for energy accounting.2  Nevertheless, all of these data show an S-shaped time 
evolution of the global Gini coefficient for energy consumption (Semieniuk and Weber, 2019).  
This behavior is qualitatively similar to the global Gini coefficient for CO2 emissions shown in 
Figure 3.  On the basis of their model, Lawrence et al. (2013) made a policy proposal that a 
transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy would not only address the environmental 
problems but also reduce global inequality in energy consumption.  Solar and wind energy can 
be locally produced and locally consumed, particularly on a small scale, thus making energy 
consumption more uniform around the world.  This is in contrast to the extraction-and-
repartitioning model for fossil fuels, where some oil-producing countries (e.g. Nigeria) consume 
very little of what is extracted from their land.  
 
Other socio-economic variables also appear to follow distributions that can be well explained by 
maximal entropy subject to plausible constraints (Scharfenaker and dos Santos, 2015; 
Scharfenaker and Semieniuk, 2017). If constraints vary, so does the shape of the distribution 
(Shaikh, 2017). Therefore, maximal entropy appears to provide a useful description of inequality 
given the socio-economic constraints. We will revisit this argument again in the discussion in 
Section 6. 
 
 
2 A similar mechanism is likely to explain the lower 0.4 Gini estimate obtained by Zimm and Nakicenovic 
(2019) for all territorial GHG emissions as opposed to only CO2, as the territorial emissions from non-CO2 
sources (significantly from agriculture) are likely to be less correlated with income and its inequality than 
CO2. 
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Figure 2: Historical evolution of the global Lorenz curve for selected years for weighted international per capita 
territorial carbon emissions based on EIA data. Each dot indicates a country’s position. Red stars represent five 
empirical carbon footprint quantiles from Hubacek et al. (2017) for 2010 only. 
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Figure 3: Historical evolution of the global Gini coefficient for the weighted international per capita territorial carbon 
emissions. Black disks show the data for 1980-2000 as published by Lawrence et al. (2013), whereas red squares 
show the new EIA data for 2011-2017. The blue dashed line is a linear extrapolation from 2000-2010. The horizontal 
line at Gini = 0.5 corresponds to a theoretical exponential distribution. 
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While some authors use the discrete expenditure datapoints to estimate a footprint density 
across the range of personal expenditures, here we calculate one carbon footprint for each 
reported expenditure quantile without making further assumptions about the functional form. 
Following Chancel and Piketty (2015), country and quantile specific carbon emissions Ciq are 
arrived at as 
 𝐶!" = 𝐶!#$# 𝑓!"𝑦!"%∑ 𝑓!"𝑦!"%" 																(1) 
 
where countries are indexed by i, quantiles by q, y is the mean expenditure in the quantile, 𝜂 is 
the elasticity of carbon footprint with respect to expenditure, and f is the share of the quantile in 
country i’s population. Citot are country i’s total emissions, so the second factor partitions these 
across quantiles. 
 
For the new dataset constructed here, data on consumption expenditure and population are 
taken from the Global Consumption and Income Project (GCIP) by Lahoti et al. (2016), which 
reports consistent expenditure data on twelve consumption quantiles. These are the bottom 
nine deciles, the 90-95th percentiles, the 95-99th percentiles, and the top one percentile, for 162 
countries in five year or smaller intervals from 1960 to 2013.3 National carbon footprints are from 
Eora’s carbon footprint database, which computes these annually for 192 countries from 1970 
(Kanemoto et al., 2016). Eora is a multi-regional input-output database that allows tracing 
carbon emissions embodied in trade to their final consumption destination (Lenzen et al., 2013). 
The intersection of the countries in the GCIP expenditure database and Eora carbon footprint 
database is 150, comprising 95.8% of the global population in 2013. Prior to 1991, data on the 
Soviet Union is missing, thus reducing the share of population to 89.8% in 1970. 
 
To compute quantile-wise emission footprints, equation (1) is applied to these GCIP-Eora data. 
An elasticity of 0.9 is chosen as the central elasticity estimate. Elasticities can vary between 
countries, expenditure quantiles, urban and rural dwellers and over time, therefore picking an 
average elasticity can only approximate the actual distribution. At the least, expenditure 
estimates are better correlated with emissions than income, as the latter can be saved and 
savings propensities differ strongly between income quantiles (Jonathan Fisher et al., 2018; 
Taylor et al., 2017). An elasticity of 0.9 is a conservative choice and appears to fall near the 
bottom of recently estimate of elasticities for large developing countries, so we are careful not to 
overstate inequality (Grubler and Pachauri, 2009; Wiedenhofer et al., 2017). 0.9 is also 
considered a plausible number for Rao and Min (2018) and used by Chancel and Piketty (2015) 
as their central estimate. While this approach is necessarily preliminary, it does serve to capture 
the approximate shape and evolution of CO2 footprint inequality. Table 1 summarizes the data 
for this estimate. All Lorenz plots use this elasticity, but to check robustness, we also present 
Gini estimates for an elasticity of 0.7 (what Rao and Min (2018) consider a very low elasticity), 
and the mirror image of 1.1. 
 
 
Table 1: Summary Stats GCIP-Eora, in metric tons CO2 per capita for n countries times 12 
quantiles (bottom 9 deciles, 90-95th vigintile, 95-99th quantile and 99-100th percentile for selected 
 
3 A subset of data is also available for 2015. However, there are significant gaps, so we restrict our 
analysis to the latest complete year 2013. 
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years, conditional on an expenditure elasticity of CO2 emissions of 0.9. Median, mean and 
standard deviation (SD) are weighted by population. 
Year n (countries) Min Median Max Mean SD 
1970 133 0.008 0.838 271.762 3.863 66.807 
1995 149 0.006 1.344 666.367 3.987 52.574 
2013 150 0.011 2.200 639.397 4.820 62.568 
 
 
We also draw on the greenhouse gas footprint dataset constructed by Chancel and Piketty 
(2015) for comparison with our results. One part of this dataset is the World Panel Income 
Database, WPID (Lakner and Milanovic, 2016) with 10 income decile data until 2008.  Another 
part is national greenhouse gas (GHG) footprints for 1997/8 and 2007/8 from the Global Trade 
Analysis Project, GTAP (Andrew and Peters, 2013). Finally, Chancel and Piketty augment these 
datasets with their own World Top Income Database, WTID (Alvaredo et al., 2016) for 1998, 
2003 and 2008, and extrapolate WPID and GTAP data to arrive at an additional datapoint in 
2013. This last datapoint relies on strong assumptions about continuity in emission and income 
patterns, which must be taken with a grain of salt given the shock these variables sustained 
from the Great Recession. 
 
In Section 2, we already introduced the data underlying cap and floor scenarios. For the cap 
scenario, Chakravarty et al. (2009) estimate 7 income quantiles for every country in their 
dataset based on various datasets from the World Bank: two deciles at bottom and top each, 
and three quintiles in between. These are combined with territorial emissions from the Energy 
Information Agency (EIA) for 2003 split across 7 quantiles using a constant elasticity of 1 and 
estimating a best fit theoretical distribution. To obtain a 2030 distribution, they take EIA 
projections for emissions and populations and assume the within-country relative income 
distributions to maintain their 2003 shape. In Section 2, we also explained Hubacek’s dataset at 
length. They also arrive at their 2030 distribution by assuming that the relative income 
distribution and emissions intensity above the floor stay as in 2010. Lastly, there is the EIA 
territorial data itself, described in Section 3. 
 
Table 2 compares the various datasets used in terms of their coverage. Note that the dataset 
used by Chancel and Piketty includes also non-CO2 greenhouse gases. 
 
 
Table 2: Comparison among datasets used 
 GCIP-Eora 
(new) 
Chancel & 
Piketty 
Hubacek et 
al. 
Chakravarty 
et al. 
EIA 
(Lawrence et 
al.) 
Emissions 
covered 
CO2 footprint All GHGs 
footprint in 
CO2 
equivalents 
CO2 footprint Territorial 
CO2  
Territorial 
CO2  
Period covered 1970-2013 1998-2008 
(extrapolated 
to 2013) 
2010, 
scenario for 
2030 
2003, 
scenario for 
2030 
1980-2016 
Countries 
covered in last 
year of data 
150* 94 93+EU 154** 199 
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Share of global 
population 
covered in last 
year of data 
95.8% 86.7% 89.6% 99.5%** >99.5% 
Quantiles 12 11 5*** 7** 1 
*Prior to 1990, the countries covered are 133. 
** 23 countries report only one average per capita CO2 emissions observation. 
***The size of quantiles is set at the global level. 
 
 
5. Global inequality in carbon footprints 
We proceed to our analysis of the evolution of historical global carbon footprint inequality by 
plotting the Lorenz curves for selected annual distributions from the newly constructed GCIP-
Eora data, as described in Section 4.  Figure 4 shows that Lorenz curves are far towards the 
bottom right corner, indicating a very high global inequality, higher than in the weighted 
international estimates shown in Figure 2.  It is generally expected that the global carbon 
footprint inequality is higher than the weighted international territorial carbon emissions 
inequality. First, rich countries tend to have higher carbon footprints than territorial emissions, 
and second, global inequality takes into account inequality within countries, whereas the latter 
does not.  Over time, the Lorenz curves in Figure 4 shift inward, so that each subsequent curve 
Lorenz-dominates the previous one (i.e. curves do not intersect). Thus, the decrease in 
inequality takes place across the distribution. The direction of evolution toward decreasing 
inequality in Figure 4 is qualitatively similar to that in Figure 2.   
 
To some extent this decrease of inequality is due to the move of Chinese footprints into the 
middle of the distribution, which is represented by the longest straight segment visible in Figure 
2, as pointed out by Lawrence et al. (2013) and documented for the global distribution of 
incomes by Lahoti et al. (2016), Milanovic (2016) and Nino-Zarazua et al. (2016).  To illustrate 
this point, Figure 4 shows the trajectory of the 5th quantile of the Chinese carbon footprint 
distribution, which is the global ranking of the average carbon footprint of a Chinese person in 
the 40th to 50th percentile of the Chinese expenditure distribution. Between 1970 and 1995, its 
rank in the global distribution hardly changed. This group had a carbon footprint that was higher 
than roughly 56% of the global population. However, from 1995 to 2010 and even more in 2013, 
the position drastically improved to being higher than almost 70% of the global population, a 
ranking that is slightly higher than that quantile’s position in the income distribution (Lakner and 
Milanovic, 2016). It is explained by the fact that China’s average carbon footprint is estimated to 
be higher in relation to the global average footprint, than its average income is to that of the 
global average income.  
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Figure 4: Lorenz plots of the Eora-GCIP data for selected years. Each dot represents an income quantile observation 
for a country. The solid line is the Lorenz curve implied by a theoretical exponential distribution. The line with black 
disks indicates how the Chinese 5th decile travels across the curve over time. 
 
 
To get a broader, if still selective, overview over the movements within the Lorenz distribution, 
Figure 5 plots the trajectories from 1995 to 2013 of each of twelve quantiles in the Lorenz 
emissions ranking (i.e. their position on the x-axis in Figure 4) for nine countries that are large 
either in terms of emissions or population or both. The top row shows large high-income 
countries: France, Germany and the US. Their almost entire population continues to have per 
capita footprints that are higher than those of 80% of the global population over the time period, 
and even 90% for the US. However, it is also evident that the lowest two deciles have seen their 
position eroded. For instance, in France, the lowest decile dropped fifteen percentage points 
from 70% to 55%. As a result, the lowest carbon footprints, which correspond to the lowest 
incomes and expenditures, in the richest countries are now lower than those at the top of 
emerging economies. 
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This is visible in the middle row, with China, India and Indonesia. Most of the Chinese 
population has moved to well above a half of the global population in terms of carbon footprints 
by 2013. What is remarkable is the upward move of the entire Chinese distribution. A close 
visual inspection also shows that all quantiles of the Indian distribution have moved up, albeit 
just few percentage points. This change is from much lower levels, with only the top 10% 
appreciably higher than 50% of global footprints. In Indonesia, only the top 5% of emitters have 
moved up, whereas the rest of the population, at most, kept their rank. The third row shows that 
emerging and developing economies have an uneven development. While South Africa and 
Brazil have about a half of their population in the higher half of global emitters, their lower 
quantiles lost ground in the ranking. Nigeria’s distribution has no overlap at all with rich country 
carbon footprints in the upper row, and the ranking of its top quantiles has not improved over 
1995 levels. In other words, the overlap between rich and poor countries’ emissions, with the 
exception of China, remains limited. 
 
As pointed out already by Chakravarty et al. (2009), capping emissions of the richest means 
capping emissions of some individuals around the world. For instance, if the top 20% emitters 
had to reduce their emissions, this would, at least, affect the top percentile in all countries 
depicted, except Nigeria. But apart from this commonality, there is a large difference in who 
would be affected: the US would see 90% of its population affected, Germany 60%, and France 
40%. China would see 30% affected, South Africa 20%, Brazil 5%, and India and Indonesia only 
1%. While Grubler and Pachauri (2009) rightly caution about the accuracy of the detailed figures 
specifically for India’s emissions and suggest there might be more high-footprint Indians, we can 
see that the ‘global’ high emitters in terms of footprints are still overwhelmingly concentrated in 
rich countries for our sample (analysis of other countries supports this conclusion). Among the 
countries depicted, only China sees a genuine upward movement in the position of its entire 
population. 
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Figure 5: Trajectories of each quantile of selected countries through the Lorenz ranking. Each dot indicates for a 
quantile the share of global population that has a lower carbon footprint in that year. The bottom nine lines depict 
deciles, the top three the 90-95th quantile, 95-99th quantile, and top percentile. 
 
 
 
 
The Lorenz trends shown in Figures 4 and 5 translate into Gini indicators decreasing from very 
high levels. Figure 6 depicts the Gini indices of the new GCIP-Eora estimates (black disks) and 
also compares them with existing ones (other symbols).  The black disks show that the Gini 
coefficients for the global CO2 footprint were consistently above 0.6. From a Gini of 0.73 in 
1970, there was a downward trend that accelerated after 2000. Between 2000 and 2013, the 
global Gini fell by about 7 points, with the fastest decline in 2005-2010, which includes the Great 
Recession. To the extent that the series before 1995 are comparable (they exclude the Soviet 
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Union, which would add to the middle of the distribution and hence likely reduce inequality), 
inequality since 1970 fell about 13 Gini points, or roughly 3 points per decade.  The trend of 
decreasing Gini coefficient in Figure 6 is qualitatively similar to the trend in Figure 3, although 
the absolute levels in Figure 6 are substantially higher. 
 
The 2010 GCIP-Eora estimate is remarkably close to the 2008 one by Chancel and Piketty, 
based on a different dataset, and is encouraging for the credibility of the results. The 2010 
estimate by Hubacek et al. 2017, relying on a bottom up estimate of consumption baskets, is 
much lower. The difference between these estimates requires further examination. But part of 
the extent of inequality in the Hubacek data may be lost by the coarsely grained income 
quantiles.  
 
Relative to any of these empirical estimates, both cap and floor scenarios are dramatically lower 
and imply halving the Gini estimate of global carbon footprint inequality. About 10 to 15 Gini 
points would have to be lost every decade after 2010 in order to get there, depending on the 
estimate. Settling on a middle value of 12 per decade, this decline would be unprecedented. 
Combining the two scenarios would require doubling this rate to achieve a Gini of about 0.07 
(not shown in Figure 6). Even the fastest drop from 2005 to 2010 only saw the Gini decline by 
3.5 points in five years, which extrapolates to 7 points per decade. This took place against the 
backdrop of the largest financial and subsequent economic crisis in rich countries since 1929, 
which eroded relative purchasing power and associated carbon footprints in their economies. 
Clearly, in comparison with historical levels and trajectories, scenarios that involve reductions in 
future carbon emissions are far away from anything seen in the recent past. 
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Figure 6 Historical evolution of the Gini coefficient for global carbon footprint. The new GCIP-Eora based estimate is 
shown by black disks for the income elasticity of carbon footprints equal 0.9 (lower and upper error bars for 0.7 and 
1.1). The Chancel & Piketty estimate is shown by grey disks with the same elasticity error bars (the empty circle for 
2013 is an extrapolation from 2008 data). The star, triangle, and square show the Gini for 2010 derived from Hubacek 
et al. (2017), and projected from the cap and floor scenarios for 2030. The horizontal line at Gini = 0.5 corresponds to 
a theoretical exponential distribution. 
 
 
6. Discussion 
How credible are the tremendous reductions in carbon footprint inequality envisioned by these 
ambitious scenarios? It appears that Rao and Min’s (2018) assumption of a maximum 7 Gini 
points per decade decline in inequality is also about the most that has been historically 
observed at the global level for only half a decade and against the backdrop of an economic 
crisis predominantly in high carbon footprint countries. The previous section showed that policy 
reaching for cap or floor or both scenarios would seek to double this decline rate.  What grounds 
would there be for more optimism about achieving ambitious carbon inequality reduction? 
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First of all, we point out that the historical data in Figure 6 show the decrease of global 
inequality in carbon footprints only up to 2013. However, the more recent historical data points 
in Figure 3 up to 2017 reveal saturation of the weighted international inequality in carbon 
emissions after 2013 at the level consistent with the maximal entropy principle. Given this 
saturation, predicted theoretically by Lawrence et al., (2013) and which is also applicable to 
global inequality, simply assuming the decreasing trend in carbon footprints inequality shown in 
Figure 6 after 2013 is unjustified. 
 
One way to force down carbon footprint inequality would be to quickly reduce income inequality, 
as the two magnitudes are highly correlated.4 The catch-up of China has recently led to a 
decrease in global income inequality (Lakner and Milanovic, 2016), and that is reflected in 
China’s climb up the ranking in Figure 5 and the decline of carbon inequality in our Figures 4 
and 6. But there is no inherent reason for this income inequality decline to persist, let along 
accelerate. Apart from China’s move, the reduction in global measures of inequality comes 
mainly from the catch-up of non-Western elites with their rich-country counterparts. This 
decoupling of an elite is even more evident in increasing concentration of wealth among a small, 
global group of high net worth individuals (Davies et al., 2018, 2017; Piketty and Zucman, 
2014). Reducing carbon inequality would require a fast break with current trends in income 
inequality. 
 
There are, at least, two reasons to believe that high inequality in incomes is likely to persist. 
First, inequality has been and remains high between countries. Although there has long been 
hope for income convergence between rich countries and developing ones based on theoretical 
claims from neoclassical economic growth models about catch-up to the technology frontier, 
there is no evidence that developing countries as a group have converged with their high-
income peers over the last 50 years, not even in terms of purchasing power parity (Johnson and 
Papageorgiou, 2020). This reflects the organization of the global economy: international trade 
and investment occur in the structured context of global capitalism. This organizational form 
generates and maintains international inequality, whether through overt colonialism predominant 
until the mid-20th century or a more indirect form of imperialism that produces unequal outcomes 
through its legal and regulatory architecture backed up by military superiority (Ghosh, 2019; 
Harvey, 2003; Kohli, 2020). Therefore, even though there is some catch up of top quantiles in 
developing countries, as Figure 5 shows, we should not expect that all of developing countries’ 
emissions would catch up with high-income country emissions any time soon.  Moreover, the 
resulting Lorenz curve after the catch-up for 2017 in Figure 2 is close to the exponential 
distribution, which maximizes entropy.  Thus, one can argue that China’s catch-up and the 
reduction of inequality from higher historical levels were implicitly driven by entropy 
maximization consistent with the constraints imposed by the current institutional structure of 
global capitalism.  Now that the exponential distribution has been reached, the maximal entropy 
principle, which applies equally well to income inequality (Yakovenko, 2013), indicates 
preservation of the current level of inequality and the end of the previous decreasing trend. 
 
Second, while international inequality in incomes has declined, inequality within countries has 
increased, certainly in richer countries (Alvaredo et al., 2018). This is often explained by 
regressive domestic economic policies and weakening of social safety nets combined with 
globalization, whereby global value chains put downward pressure on less-skilled workers’ 
 
4 In fact, the Gini graph for carbon emissions in Figure 3 is very similar to the Gini graph for weighted 
international income inequality (Concept 2) shown up to 2006 in Figure 1 of Milanovic (2012).  This 
observation further confirms that global inequalities in income and carbon emissions are closely related. 
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wages (or increase unemployment outright) in rich countries through competition with 
developing countries, while the incomes of managers at company headquarters grow faster 
(Aguiar de Medeiros and Trebat, 2017; Milberg and Winkler, 2013; Wood, 1995). And despite 
rhetoric to the contrary, the current US administration’s policies have supported an 
entrenchment of these trends (Mayer and Phillips, 2019). Therefore, while inequality is 
responsive to institutional changes (Milanovic, 2016), reconfiguring the economic landscape so 
as to produce a double-digit Gini coefficient decline in income inequality in a matter of a decade 
appears highly unlikely. In this context, it is revealing that even the most optimistic “shared 
socioeconomic pathways” about future social trends, which are selected as the main scenarios 
for International Panel on Climate Change’s forthcoming 6th assessment report, project only 
modest declines in income inequality in developing countries and rising inequality in high-
income countries (Rao et al., 2019). In conclusion, to the extent that carbon remains coupled 
with income and expenditure, a fast decrease in carbon emissions would need to be forced 
against the structural tendencies towards high socio-economic inequality of the current 
economic system. The results in Figure 3 of a Gini coefficient converging to a (high) level of 0.5 
also support this conclusion. 
 
This leaves open the question whether CO2 footprints can be decoupled from income, which 
would enable both poverty eradication and capping emissions without interfering with the 
income distribution at the top. At the bottom of the footprint distribution, there is some hope of 
‘leap-frogging’ dirty technologies, such as directly building electrified public transport 
infrastructure and skipping transport based on internal combustion engines. However, one 
problem with this approach is that it leaves unexplained just how the bottom billions of people 
could quickly improve their incomes. Historically this has happened via industrialization, which 
implies energy-intensive industrial processes (that are also carbon intensive, if energy is 
supplied from fossil fuels), such as steel and cement production (Semieniuk et al., 2019). The 
worry by development economists about “premature deindustrialization” suggests that there is 
as yet no other path even to modest prosperity (Rodrik, 2016). 
 
At the top end of incomes, one could imagine consumption shifting to lower-carbon commodities 
in the luxury segment, possibly aided by strong incentives or regulation. For instance, richer 
people could source 100% of electricity in the household from renewables with back-up 
batteries, travel via luxury electric cars, commute by non-emitting air taxi, see e.g. Uber’s 
Elevate project (Holden and Goel, 2016), and buy products that are certified produced with non-
fossil energy. In such a scenario, the richest persons might eventually emit less per person than 
their middle-class counterparts, who cannot afford relatively expensive low-carbon products. 
This would make high-income inequality compatible with the cap proposal. However, current 
data on the consumption baskets of high net-worth individuals, which are not accurately 
reflected in the surveys we examined, but are best represented by the footprint of the top 
percentile, suggests the opposite. Lifestyles and occupations of the richest persons rely crucially 
on products that are hard to decarbonize, such as frequent long-distance flying – often in private 
jets (Gössling, 2019; Otto et al., 2019). Thus, the elasticity of the top emitters may be 
particularly high and the opposite scenario of rising carbon inequality at the top might obtain, as 
the number of millionaires and billionaires increases. Moreover, some products are low carbon 
only during usage, but not over their life cycle. For instance, current solar PV panel 
manufacturing methods emit significant amount of CO2 (Miller et al., 2019). With a footprint 
approach, even if the manufacturing takes place abroad, this will still be attributed to the 
consumers of solar electricity. Therefore, direct measures regarding consumers would need to 
be complemented with decarbonizing in the industrial sector (Liu and van den Bergh, 2020). 
Finally, to the extent that emissions are saved through energy efficiency improvements, the 
monetary savings can lead to additional purchases of other more carbon intensive products, 
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causing rebound effects (Feng et al., 2015; Thomas and Azevedo, 2013). Of course, even if 
highest-income lifestyles could be decarbonized, this dynamic would spell trouble of another 
kind. Since real-world emission reductions are likely to rely on a carbon price, the 
decarbonization of the rich’s consumption baskets leads to climate change mitigation policy 
becoming even more regressive than it would be with current consumption patterns (Boyce, 
2018). This leads right back to the problem of income inequality. 
 
This ultimately points to the pivotal importance of decarbonizing the entire energy supply (not 
just electricity), which reduces everyone’s carbon footprint, through the low-carbon energy 
embodied in final products, regardless of income distribution. Importantly, it would also remove 
the perverse effect of associating the eradication of poverty and reduction of inequality at the 
lower end with strong increases in carbon emissions. A low-carbon energy supply sidesteps the 
redistributive issues around demand-side decarbonization, because it decouples energy 
demand from carbon emissions at all income levels. The poorest households often do not yet 
have access to even the most basic energy services (such as electrification). For this segment 
of the population, there is therefore a particular opportunity to provision services from a low-
carbon energy supply, and never install fossil energy generation in the first place (Brand-Correa 
et al., 2018; Pachauri, 2014). This decarbonization, and also poverty eradication, would work 
even as relative carbon inequality might remain high. 
 
The foregoing analysis of the structural constraints on lowering carbon inequality has a close 
connection with the discussion of maximum entropy in Section 3. The maximum entropy 
approach predicts that emissions tend to a certain (rather unequal) distribution given 
constraints. In the case of territorial emissions, the weighted international distribution is well 
predicted by maximum entropy only with a constraint on total emissions to converge to an 
exponential one, at least as long as a large share of energy comes from tradable fossil sources. 
In the case of the footprint, our discussion suggests that other constraints might keep inequality 
at an even higher level. Institutional change would need to remove these constraints and erect 
others that keep inequality at a low level (Reddy, 2020). Our argument here is that given the 
evidence about current global economic structures and trajectories, it would be difficult to 
change these constraints in the manner and at the pace to attain low inequality sufficiently 
quickly.  
7. Conclusions 
 
This paper has quantified and analyzed international and global carbon emission and footprint 
inequality and contrasted historical trends with the projected inequality in scenarios that would 
cap and floor per capita footprints to achieve ambitious climate mitigation goals. The results 
show just how striking a departure from historical inequality trends may be required to achieve 
the twin goals of poverty eradication and climate change mitigation via that strategy. It is 
tempting to argue that the future will look different from the past, because ambitious mitigation 
and poverty reduction policies have not yet been tried. However, we also show based on our 
results and drawing on recent literature on global capitalism that it would be a herculean task for 
policy makers to overcome the structural forces of the current economic system that reinforces 
high socio-economic inequality within and between countries. We conclude that policy should 
focus strongly on decarbonizing the energy supply, so that climate change mitigation and 
poverty reduction would not require equality of carbon footprints. 
 
An important result of our study is the empirical demonstration of the striking convergence of the 
distribution of weighted international inequality in territorial carbon emissions to an exponential 
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form, implying stabilization of inequality at a 0.5 Gini coefficient. One of the authors predicted 
this convergence based on maximum entropy reasoning before it was evident in the available 
historical data (Lawrence et al., 2013). The subsequent confirmation shows that the predictions 
based on the combinatorial arguments about most likely distributions fare well with respect to 
carbon emissions. It also suggests that global carbon footprint inequality, which is estimated to 
be variously around 0.5 or higher, depending on the method of estimation, may similarly be 
bounded from below due to the prevailing constraints, adding more impetus to the demand for 
energy supply decarbonization. 
 
This article has characterized the inequality in current global carbon footprint estimates and 
advanced arguments for why it may be relatively stable as long as the energy supply is mostly 
fossil fuels. Further research could attempt to collect the increasingly dense coverage of 
national income elasticity estimates of carbon footprints to improve the measurement of the 
extent and evolution of carbon and greenhouse gas footprints. It could also attempt to 
characterize constraints on inequality that arise from the current structure of the global economy 
and identify ways in which changes in structure, e.g. through deliberate policy, could overcome 
these constraints. 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
The authors have benefitted from discussions with Lopamudra Banerjee, Paulo dos Santos, 
Duncan Foley, Sanjay Reddy, Lance Taylor, Isabella Weber and from Scott Lawrence’s updated 
Gini graph of weighted international CO2 emissions. They are grateful to Klaus Hubacek and co-
authors for sharing their carbon equivalent footprint data, and to Lucas Chancel and Thomas 
Piketty for making their data available online. 
 
8. References 
Aguiar de Medeiros, C., Trebat, N., 2017. Inequality and Income Distribution in Global Value 
Chains. J. Econ. Issues 51, 401–408. https://doi.org/10.1080/00213624.2017.1320916 
Aldy, J.E., 2006. Per capita carbon dioxide emissions: Convergence or divergence? Environ. 
Resour. Econ. 33, 533–555. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-005-6160-x 
Alvaredo, F., Atkinson, A.B., Chancel, L., Piketty, T., Saez, E., Zucman, G., 2016. Distributional 
National Accounts Guidelines: Methods and Concepts Used in WID.world. World Inequal. 
Lab. 
Alvaredo, F., Chancel, L., Piketty, T., Saez, E., Zucman, G., 2018. World Inequality Report 
2018. Harvard University Press. 
Andrew, R.M., Peters, G.P., 2013. A Multi-Region Input-Output Table Based on the Global 
Trade Analysis Project Database (GTAP-MRIO). Econ. Syst. Res. 25, 99–121. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09535314.2012.761953 
Bailey, I., 2010. Copenhagen and the new political geographies of climate change. Polit. Geogr. 
29, 127–129. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2010.02.008 
Banerjee, A., Yakovenko, V.M., 2010. Universal patterns of inequality. New J. Phys. 12. 
https://doi.org/10.1088/1367-2630/12/7/075032 
Boyce, J.K., 2019. The Case for Carbon Dividends. Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, and Medford, 
MA. 
Boyce, J.K., 2018. Carbon Pricing: Effectiveness and Equity. Ecol. Econ. 150, 52–61. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2018.03.030 
Brand-Correa, L.I., Martin-Ortega, J., Steinberger, J.K., 2018. Human Scale Energy Services: 
 23/26 
Untangling a ‘golden thread.’ Energy Res. Soc. Sci. 38, 178–187. 
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2018.01.008 
Cantore, N., Padilla, E., 2010. Equality and CO2 emissions distribution in climate change 
integrated assessment modelling. Energy 35, 298–313. 
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2009.09.022 
Chakravarty, S., Chikkatur, A., de Coninck, H., Pacala, S., Socolow, R., Tavoni, M., 2009. 
Sharing global CO2 emission reductions among one billion high emitters. Proc. Natl. Acad. 
Sci. 106, 11884 LP – 11888. 
Chancel, L., Piketty, T., 2015. Carbon and Inequality: from Kyoto to Paris. Paris Sch. Econ. 
https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.1.3536.0082 
Cowell, F., 2011. Measuring Inequality, 3rd ed, London School of Economics Perspectives in 
Economic Analysis. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199594030.001.0001 
Davies, J.B., Lluberas, R., Shorrocks, A.F., 2017. Estimating the level and distribution of global 
wealth, 2000–2014. Rev. Income Wealth 63. 
Davies, J.B., Sandström, S., Shorrocks, A., Wolff, E.N., 2018. The Level and Distribution of 
Global Household Wealth. Econ. J. 121, 223–254. 
Dragulescu, A., Yakovenko, V.M., 2001. Evidence for the exponential distribution of income in 
the USA. Eur. Phys. J. B 20, 585–589. 
Dragulescu, A., Yakovenko, V.M., 2000. Statistical mechanics of money. Eur. Phys. J. B 17, 
723–729. https://doi.org/10.1007/s100510070114 
Duro, J.A., 2013. Weighting vectors and international inequality changes in environmental 
indicators: An analysis of CO2 per capita emissions and Kaya factors. Energy Econ. 39, 
122–127. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2013.04.005 
Feng, K., Davis, S.J., Sun, L., Hubacek, K., 2015. Drivers of the US CO2 emissions 1997-2013. 
Nat. Commun. 6, 1–8. https://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms8714 
Ghosh, J., 2019. A Brave New World, or the Same Old Story with New Characters? Dev. 
Change 50, 379–393. https://doi.org/10.1111/dech.12485 
Gössling, S., 2019. Celebrities, air travel, and social norms. Ann. Tour. Res. 79, 102775. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.annals.2019.102775 
Groot, L., 2010. Carbon Lorenz curves. Resour. Energy Econ. 32, 45–64. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.reseneeco.2009.07.001 
Grubler, A., Pachauri, S., 2009. Problems with burden-sharing proposal among one billion high 
emitters. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 106, E122–E123. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0909994106 
Grunewald, N., Jakob, M., Mouratiadou, I., 2014. Decomposing inequality in CO2 emissions: 
The role of primary energy carriers and economic sectors. Ecol. Econ. 100, 183–194. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2014.02.007 
Harvey, D., 2003. The New Imperialism. Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York. 
Heil, M.T., Wodon, Q.T., 1997. Inequality in CO₂ Emissions Between Poor and Rich Countries. 
J. Environ. Dev. 6, 426–452. 
Holden, J., Goel, N., 2016. Fast-Forwarding to a Future of On-Demand Urban Air 
Transportation. Uber. 
Hubacek, K., Baiocchi, G., Feng, K., Patwardhan, A., 2017. Poverty eradication in a carbon 
constrained world. Nat. Commun. 8, 1–8. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-017-00919-4 
Islam, S.N., Winkel, J., 2017. Climate Change and Social Inequality. DESA Work. Pap. 152. 
Jacobson, A., Milman, A.D., Kammen, D.M., 2005. Letting the (energy) Gini out of the bottle: 
Lorenz curves of cumulative electricity consumption and Gini coefficients as metrics of 
energy distribution and equity. Energy Policy 33, 1825–1832. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2004.02.017 
Jenkins, J.D., 2014. Political economy constraints on carbon pricing policies: What are the 
implications for economic efficiency, environmental efficacy, and climate policy design? 
 24/26 
Energy Policy 69, 467–477. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2014.02.003 
Johnson, P., Papageorgiou, C., 2020. What Remains of Cross-Country Convergence ? J. Econ. 
Lit. 58, 129–175. 
Jonathan Fisher, David Johnson, Jonathan Latner, Timothy Smeeding, 2018. Estimating the 
marginal propensity to consume using the distributions of income, consumption, and 
wealth. Equitable Growth 32. 
Kander, A., Jiborn, M., Moran, D.D., Wiedmann, T.O., 2015. National greenhouse-gas 
accounting for effective climate policy on international trade. Nat. Clim. Chang. 5, 431–435. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2555 
Kanemoto, K., Moran, D., Hertwich, E.G., 2016. Mapping the Carbon Footprint of Nations. 
Environ. Sci. Technol. 50, 10512–10517. https://doi.org/10.1021/acs.est.6b03227 
Kohli, A., 2020. Imperialism and the Developing World. Oxford University Press, New York. 
Lahoti, R., Jayadev, A., Reddy, S.G., 2016. The Global Consumption and Income Project 
(GCIP): An Overview. J. Glob. Dev. 7, 61–108. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2480636 
Lakner, C., Milanovic, B., 2016. Global income distribution: From the fall of the berlinwall to the 
great recession. World Bank Econ. Rev. 30, 203–232. https://doi.org/10.1093/wber/lhv039 
Lawrence, S., Liu, Q., Yakovenko, V.M., 2013. Global inequality in energy consumption from 
1980 to 2010. Entropy 15, 5565–5579. https://doi.org/10.3390/e15125565 
Lenzen, M., Moran, D., Kanemoto, K., Geschke, A., 2013. Building EORA: A Global Multi-
Region Input-Output Database at High Country and Sector Resolution. Econ. Syst. Res. 
25, 20–49. 
Liu, F., van den Bergh, J.C.J.M., 2020. Differences in CO2 emissions of solar PV production 
among technologies and regions: Application to China, EU and USA. Energy Policy 138, 
111234. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2019.111234 
Mayer, F.W., Phillips, N., 2019. Global inequality and the Trump administration. Rev. Int. Stud. 
45, 502–510. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210518000517 
Milanovic, B., 2016. Global inequality : a new approach for the age of globalization. The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Milanovic, B., 2012. Global inequality recalculated and updated: The effect of new PPP 
estimates on global inequality and 2005 estimates. J. Econ. Inequal. 10, 1–18. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10888-010-9155-y 
Milanovic, B., 2005. Worlds Apart. Princeton University Press. 
Milberg, W., Winkler, D., 2013. Outsourcing Economics: Global Value Chains in Capitalist 
Development. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. https://doi.org/DOI: 
10.1017/CBO9781139208772 
Miller, I., Gençer, E., Vogelbaum, H.S., Brown, P.R., Torkamani, S., O’Sullivan, F.M., 2019. 
Parametric modeling of life cycle greenhouse gas emissions from photovoltaic power. Appl. 
Energy 238, 760–774. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2019.01.012 
Nino-Zarazua, M., Roope, L., Tarp, F., 2016. Global Inequality: Relatively Lower, Absolutely 
Higher. Rev. Income Wealth 63, 661–684. https://doi.org/10.1111/roiw.12240 
Otto, I.M., Kim, K.M., Dubrovsky, N., Lucht, W., 2019. Shift the focus from the super-poor to the 
super-rich. Nat. Clim. Chang. 9, 82–84. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-019-0402-3 
Pachauri, S., 2014. Household electricity access a trivial contributor to CO2 emissions growth in 
India. Nat. Clim. Chang. 4, 1073–1076. https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2414 
Pan, X., Teng, F., Tian, Y., Wang, G., 2015. Countries’ emission allowances towards the low-
carbon world: A consistent study. Appl. Energy 155, 218–228. 
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2015.06.011 
Peters, G.P., Minx, J.C., Weber, C.L., Edenhofer, O., 2011. Growth in emission transfers via 
international trade from 1990 to 2008. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 108, 8903–8908. 
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1006388108 
Pettersson, F., Maddison, D., Acar, S., Söderholm, P., 2014. Convergence of Carbon Dioxide 
 25/26 
Emissions: A Review of the Literature. Int. Rev. Environ. Resour. Econ. 7, 141–178. 
https://doi.org/10.1561/101.00000059 
Piketty, T., Zucman, G., 2014. Capital is Back: Wealth-Income Ratios in Rich Countries 1700-
2010. Q. J. Econ. 129, 1255–1310. 
Rao, N.D., Min, J., 2018. Less global inequality can improve climate outcomes. Wiley 
Interdiscip. Rev. Clim. Chang. 9, 1–6. https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.513 
Rao, N.D., Sauer, P., Gidden, M., Riahi, K., 2019. Income inequality projections for the Shared 
Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs). Futures 105, 27–39. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2018.07.001 
Reddy, S., 2020. What is an Explanation? Statistical Physics and Economics. Eur. Phys. J. STF 
Forthcomin. 
Rodrik, D., 2016. Premature deindustrialization. J. Econ. Growth 21, 1–33. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10887-015-9122-3 
Rogelj, J., den Elzen, M., Höhne, N., Fransen, T., Fekete, H., Winkler, H., Schaeffer, R., Sha, 
F., Riahi, K., Meinshausen, M., 2016. Paris Agreement climate proposals need a boost to 
keep warming well below 2 °C. Nature 534, 631–639. https://doi.org/10.1038/nature18307 
Rosser, J.B., 2020. THE MINSKY MOMENT AS THE REVENGE OF ENTROPY. Macroecon. 
Dyn. 24, 7–23. https://doi.org/DOI: 10.1017/S1365100518000421 
Rosser, J.B., 2016. Entropy and econophysics. Eur. Phys. J. Spec. Top. 225, 3091–3104. 
https://doi.org/10.1140/epjst/e2016-60166-y 
Sager, L., 2019. Income inequality and carbon consumption: Evidence from Environmental 
Engel curves. Energy Econ. 104507. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2019.104507 
Scharfenaker, E., dos Santos, P.L., 2015. The distribution and regulation of Tobin’s q. Econ. 
Lett. 137, 191–194. 
Scharfenaker, E., Semieniuk, G., 2017. A Statistical Equilibrium Approach to the Distribution of 
Profit Rates. Metroeconomica 68, 465–499. https://doi.org/10.1111/meca.12134 
Schiermeier, Q., 2012. Commitments made under the Kyoto climate treaty expire at the end of 
2012, but emissions are rising faster than ever. Nature 491, 656–658. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/491656a 
Schor, J., 2015. Climate, Inequality, and the Need for Reframing Climate Policy. Rev. Radic. 
Polit. Econ. 47, 525–536. https://doi.org/10.1177/0486613415576114 
Semieniuk, G., Foley, D.K., Taylor, L., Rezai, A., 2019. Do the IPCC 1.5°C scenarios stand up 
to historical scrutiny? Forthcom. SOAS Econ Work. Pap. Ser. 
Semieniuk, G., Weber, I.M., 2019. Inequality in Energy Consumption: Statistical Equilibrium or a 
Question of Accounting Conventions? Eur. Phys. J. ST forthcomin. 
Sen, A., Foster, J., 1997. On Economic Inequality, 2nd ed. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/0198281935.001.0001 
Shaikh, A., 2017. Income Distribution, Econophysics and Piketty. Rev. Polit. Econ. 29, 18–29. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09538259.2016.1205295 
Tao, Y., Wu, X., Zhou, T., Yan, W., Huang, Y., Yu, H., Mondal, B., Yakovenko, V.M., 2019. 
Exponential structure of income inequality: evidence from 67 countries. J. Econ. Interact. 
Coord. 14, 345–376. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11403-017-0211-6 
Taylor, L., Rezai, A., Kumar, R., Barbosa, N., Carvalho, L., 2017. Wage increases, transfers, 
and the socially determined income distribution in the USA. Rev. Keynes. Econ. 5, 259–
275. https://doi.org/10.4337/roke.2017.02.07 
Thomas, B.A., Azevedo, I.L., 2013. Estimating direct and indirect rebound effects for U.S. 
households with input–output analysis Part 1: Theoretical framework. Ecol. Econ. 86, 199–
210. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2012.12.003 
Tukker, A., Pollitt, H., Henkemans, M., 2020. Consumption-based carbon accounting : sense 
and sensibility. Clim. Policy In press, 1–13. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2020.1728208 
 26/26 
Wang, H., Zhou, P., 2018. Assessing Global CO2 Emission Inequality From Consumption 
Perspective: An Index Decomposition Analysis. Ecol. Econ. 154, 257–271. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2018.08.008 
Wiedenhofer, D., Guan, D., Liu, Z., Meng, J., Zhang, N., Wei, Y.M., 2017. Unequal household 
carbon footprints in China. Nat. Clim. Chang. 7, 75–80. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate3165 
Wood, A., 1995. North-South Trade, Employment, and Inequality: Changing Fortunes in a Skill-
driven World, paperbacks. Clarendon Press, Oxford and New York. 
Yakovenko, V.M., 2013. Applications of statistical mechanics to economics: entropic origin of 
the probability distributions of money, income, and energy consumption, in: Taylor, L., 
Rezai, A., Michl, T. (Eds.), Social Fairness and Economics: Economic Essays in the Spirit 
of Duncan Foley. Routledge, Oxford and New York, pp. 53–82. 
Yakovenko, V.M., Rosser, J.B., 2009. Colloquium: Statistical mechanics of money, wealth, and 
income. Rev. Mod. Phys. 81, 1703–1725. https://doi.org/10.1103/RevModPhys.81.1703 
Zimm, C., Nakicenovic, N., 2019. What are the implications of the Paris Agreement for 
inequality? Clim. Policy In Press, 1–10. https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2019.1581048 
 
